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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
J.DOUGLAS COMPTON,* CINDY L. TURCOTTE,**
AND NINA H. COMPTON***

I. INTRODUCTION
The majority of the New Mexico medical malpractice cases decided during
the survey period' dealt with the issues surrounding the timely filing of the claim.
In these cases the courts discussed the accrual of the cause of action, the tolling
of the statute of limitations, and the applicable statute of limitations for an action
that arose prior to the enactment of the Medical Malpractice Act. 2 In addition,
the court of appeals examined the conflict between the limitation period timing
and accrual under the Medical Malpractice Act3 and the timing and accrual of
actions under the Tort Claims Act. 4 Finally, the article analyzes several Tenth
Circuit cases concerning medical malpractice claims in New Mexico, and a
significant non-New Mexico Tenth Circuit case.
II. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS UNDER THE
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACT
In most personal injury actions, the statute of limitations begins to run or
accrues at the time the injury occurs.' This date may or may not correspond to
the time of the negligence or wrongful act. Some injuries occur at the time of
the wrongful act but do not manifest themselves in a physically objective manner
until a later date. Whether the cause of action accrues at the time of the wrongful
act, at the time of the injury, at the manifestation of the injury or at the time
the patient discovers the cause of the injury depends upon the jurisdiction and
its policies.
The New Mexico Medical Malpractice Act' was enacted in 1976 with an
express legislative purpose of promoting "the health and welfare of the people
of New Mexico by making available professional liability insurance for health
*Shareholder, Butt, Thornton & Baehr, P.C., Albuquerque, New Mexico; University of Virginia (B.A.
1973); Mercer University-Walter F. George School of Law (J.D. 1978); Member, New Mexico and Georgia
Bars.
**Associate, Butt, Thornton & Baehr, P.C., Albuquerque, New Mexico; University of Montana (B.S.W.
1983); University of New Mexico School of Law (J.D. 1988); Member, New Mexico Bar.
***Associate Professor of Business Law, New Mexico State University; University of New Mexico
(B.A. 1972; M.A. 1973); Delaware Law School of Widener College (J.D. 1979); Member, New Mexico
Bar.
I. An expanded survey period of March 1985 to April 1987 was chosen because medical malpractice
cases have not been covered in a survey article since March 1985.
2. N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-5-1 to -28 (Repl. Pamp. 1986) Ihereinafter Act].
3. Id. §41-5-13.
4. N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-5-14(A), Long v. Weaver, 105 N.M. 188, 730 P.2d 491 (Ct. App. 1986).
5. N.M. STAT. ANN. §37-1-8 (Repl. Pamp. 1986).
6. N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-5-1 to -28.
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care providers in New Mexico. 7 The statute of limitations provisions in the Act
were part of several tort reforms enacted by New Mexico and other legislatures,
in response to the medical malpractice insurance crisis, to curb the increase in
the number and severity of claims and assure the availability of malpractice
insurance.' Having several options for the timing of the accrual of the medical
malpractice cause of action, the legislature chose the clear language of the
wrongful act rule 9 stating that no claim shall be filed after three years from the
date the act of malpractice occurred.'" Section 41-5-13 of the Act provides that:
[n]o claim for malpractice arising out of an act of malpractice which occurred
subsequent to the effective date of the Medical Malpractice Act may be
brought against a health care provider unless filed within three years after
the date that the act of malpractice occurred except that a minor under the
full age of six years shall have until his ninth birthday in which to file."
New Mexico courts have strictly construed the Act's wrongful act accrual and
limitations provisions since its enactment. 12
II. PRIMARY SURVEY PERIOD
A. The Statute of Limitations Priorto the Medical MalpracticeAct
Prior to the adoption of the Act, medical malpractice cases in New Mexico
were governed by the limitations period that applied to all personal injury actions,
which was three years after the cause of action accrued. 3 The supreme court
initially chose the date of the wrongful act as the time for accrual of a negligence
action against a medical professional in Roybal v. White.' 4 The supreme court
reasoned (1) that the wrongful act rule was the majority rule and (2) that the
legislature evidenced an intent to reject the discovery rule for tort actions when
it drafted the general personal injury statute.' 5
Historically, the wrongful act rule recognized that defendant's actions constituted a legal wrong at the time of the occurrence or the alleged wrongful
conduct by the defendant to the plaintiff. 6 The policy behind the wrongful act
rule discouraged complacent plaintiffs from procrastinating and then suddenly
7. Id. §41-5-2; Otero v. Zouhar, 102 N.M. 493, 697 P.2d 493, 499-500 (Ct. App. 1984), rev'd on other
grounds, 102 N.M. 482, 697 P.2d 482 (1985) (challenged wisdom of legislative purpose in the Act under
due process and equal protection arguments denied where no showing that Act's enactment not rationally
related to legislative purpose).
8. Danzon, The Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims: New Evidence, 49 Law and
Contemp. Probs. 57, fn. I, 71 (Spring 1986).
9. Kern v. St. Joseph Hospital, Inc., 102 N.M. 452, 455, 697 P.2d 135, 138 (1985).
10. N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-5-13.
I1. N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-5-13.
12. Armijo v. Tandysh, 98 N.M. 181, 646 P.2d 1245 (Ct. App. 1981), writ. quashed, 98 N.M. 336,
648 P.2d 794 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1016 (1982) (denial of equal protection challenge to Act's
similar treatment of accrual of cause of actions against qualified and non-qualified health care providers).
See also Crumpton v. Humana, Inc., 99 N.M. 562, 661 P.2d 54 (1983); Ealy v. Sheppeck, 100 N.M. 250,
669 P.2d 259 (Ct. App. 1983), op. on reh'g, 100 N.M. 252, 669 P.2d 261, writ. quashed, 100 N.M. 259,
669 P.2d 735 (1983).
13. N.M. STAT. ANN. §37-1-8.
14. 72 N.M. 285, 383 P.2d 250 (1963).
15. Id. at 287, 383 P.2d at 252.
16. See Barrett v. Jackson, 44 Ga. App. 611, 162 S.E. 308 (1932).
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declaring that their knowledge of the cause of action was fresh on discovery of
their injury many years after the injury. 7
In 1977, the court of appeals reread Roybal and in Peralta v. Martinez"8
expressly disagreed with the Supreme Court's reliance in Roybal on New Mexico
precedent. After a new reading of the legislative intent for both malpractice and
personal injury actions not involving malpractice, the court of appeals concluded
that the "injury" language of the general limitations provision in Section
23-1-8, N.M.S.A. 1953 begins running at the time the injury manifests itself in
a physically objective manner and is reasonably ascertainable, rather than at the
time of the wrongful act.' 9 The court specifically stated that the physically
objective and ascertainable standard is not the discovery rle. 2 The discovery
of the act constituting malpractice (the presence of the sponge on second surgery)
did not commence the statute; the statute began to run when the patient experienced pain, which could be ascertainable and correlated to the alleged malpractice only on removal of the sponge during the second surgery.2
Recently, in Loesch v. Henderson,22 a case decided during the primary survey
period, the court of appeals reaffirmed the manifested and ascertainable standard
for cases arising prior to the effective date of the Act. Again, the court insisted
that the standard is different from the discovery rule.23 In Loesch, the court
rejected the plaintiff's argument that the general limitation period is a discovery
limitations rule that would run at the date of the discovery of the injury.24 Rather,
the court stated, the limitation period begins to run from the time the injury
manifests itself and is ascertainable. 25
The Loesch court also addressed a tolling issue, which determined the outcome
of the untimely filing of the claim. The plaintiff claimed, and the trial court
agreed, that the statute of limitations would be tolled while the medical review
panel reviewed the malpractice claim and rendered its decision. 26 The court of
appeals rejected the tolling argument relying on the provision of the Act which
prohibits coverage of the Act to acts of malpractice that occurred prior to the
effective date of the Act. 7
17. See Chitty v. Home-Wilson, Inc., 92 Ga. App. 716, 719, 89 S.E.2d 816, 819 (1955).
18. 90 N.M. 391, 564 P.2d 194 (Ct. App.), cert. denied. 90 N.M. 636, 567, P.2d 485 (1977).
19. Id. at 393-394, 564 P.2d at 196-197.
20. Id. Relying on Layton v. Allen, 246 A.2d 794 (Del. Super. Ct. 1968), the court reasoned that the
limitations period would not run from the time of discovery of the foreign object (hemostat or cottonoid)
but rather from the time the plaintiff first experienced pain caused by an unknown foreign object. 90 N.M.
at 394.
21. 90 N.M. at 394, 564 P.2d at 197. The ascertainment of the injury in this case corresponded to
discovery of the cottonoid or alleged malpractice.
22. 103 N.M. 554, 710 P.2d 748 (Ct. App. 1985).
23. Id. at 555, 710 P.2d at 749. The alleged act of malpractice occurred on February 20, 1976, seven
days prior to the effective date of the Act, so that the general limitations period under N.M. STAT. ANN.
§37-1-8 applied. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. By using the general limitations statute, the plaintiff gained five years and two months to begin
the running of the statute of limitations.
26. Id. at 555, 710 P.2d at 749. See also N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-5-22 (1978).
27. Loesch, 103 N.M. at 556, 710 P.2d at 750. The court additionally rejected the plaintiff's argument,
not raised in the trial court, that defendants be judicially estopped from contending that the tolling provision
of N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-5-22 did not apply because they participated in the panel hearing. Id. at 555,
710 P.2d at 749.
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B. FraudulentConcealment Exception
Under the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, the statute of limitations may
be tolled if a physician conceals his malpractice. 28 The basis for the fraudulent
concealment rule is the relationship of trust and confidence between a physician
or hospital and the patient as well as the physician and hospital's corresponding
duty to disclose material information to the patient." Most jurisdictions require
either an affirmative act or actual knowledge of the patient's condition by the
physician as a necessary element of fraudulent concealment.3" New Mexico has
held that mere silence by the physician or hospital and failure to disclose to the
patient the fact of the inflicted injury may constitute fraudulent concealment thus
following the minority rule on this theory.3'
In 1974, the New Mexico Court of Appeals recognized the fraudulent concealment exception to the general statute of limitations.32 Subsequently, the court,
in Garcia v. PresbyterianHospital, extended that exception to hospital liability
for its employees' nondisclosure.33 Two recent radiation therapy cases, Keithley
v. St. Joseph Hospital' and Kern v. St. Joseph Hospital,35 present interesting
fact situations within the context of concealed malpractice. In both cases the
court upheld the general rule that the Act's statute of limitations is tolled where
the physician or hospital has knowledge of facts relating to malpractice and fails
to disclose such facts to a plaintiff who has no knowledge of the facts or cannot
discover them by reasonable diligence. 6
In Keithley, the decedent received radiation therapy for cancer of the bladder
and a few months later experienced loss of bladder control and severe back pain
in the pelvic region. 37 When the decedent made inquiries to the physician about
the cause of the problems, the physician attributed them to arthritis.3" Four months
later it was determined that the decedent's bladder had shrunk, and surgery
revealed that his bladder was in poor condition.39 The decedent reportedly died
of cancer a month after the surgery."
Soon thereafter, the decedent's wife wrote to the hospital administrator stating
her belief that the radiologist had administered excessive radiation treatments to
28. Hardin v. Farris, 87 N.M. 143, 530 P.2d 407 (Ct. App. 1974).
29. Hardin, 87 N.M. at 145, 530 P.2d at 409; Garcia, 92 N.M. at 652, 593 P.2d at 487.
30. See, e.g., Ray v. Scheibert, 224 Tenn. 99, 450 S.W.2d 578 (1969). In these jurisdictions, silence
alone does not import a deliberate concealment, an intentional hiding or the misrepresentation of material
facts. See, e.g., De Haan v. Winter, 258 Mich 293, 241 N.W. 293 (1932). Some jurisdictions require
actual knowledge on the part of the physician as to the incidence of wrong done to the patient. Id. Other
jurisdictions apply the general rule that an affirmative act by the physician is necessary as an element of
concealment.
31. See ld. at 46, 530 P.2d at 410; Garcia v. Presbyterian Hosp., 92 N.M. 652, 593 P.2d 487 (Ct. App.
1979).
32. Hardin, 87 N.M. at 146, 530 P.2d at 410.
33. Garcia, 92 N.M. at 655, 593 P.2d at 490.
34. 102 N.M. 565, 698 P.2d 435 (Ct. App. 1984), writ. quashed, Murrel v. Keithley, 102 N.M. 565,
698 P.2d 435 (1985).
35. 102 N.M. 452, 697 P.2d 135 (1985).
36. Keithley, 102 N.M. at 569, 698 P.2d at 439; Kern, 102 N.M. at 456, 697 P.2d at 139.
37. Keithley, 102 N.M. at 568, 698 P.2d at 438.
38. Id.

39. Id.
40. Id.
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her husband and that the threatment had caused her husband's bladder to shrink. 4'
The wife asked the administrator to investigate the cause of her husband's problem and requested a final bill. 2 The director of the hospital's business services
responded by notifying the wife that there were no outstanding charges for the
decedent's radiation treatments. 43 The director did not mention the plaintiff's
allegations of improper treatment. 44
Two years later, the wife read a newspaper article indicating that the state was
investigating radiation treatment overdoses at the hospital.45 Subsequently, the
wife wrote to the New Mexico Environmental Improvement Division relating
her husband's treatment.' Finally, more than five years after her husband's
radiation treatments, the wife filed suit.47
In granting defendant's motion for summary judgment, the trial court seemed
to have accepted the defendant's argument that the plaintiff had sufficient knowledge to perfect a suit before the statute had run.48 The court of appeals reversed
on the grounds that the hospital's failure to respond to plaintiff's assertions of
improper treatment constituted a form of passive fraudulent concealment.49 The
confidential nature of the hospital-patient relationship, the court noted, requires
that the hospital disclose to the patient facts indicating improper treatment. 5"
Since the hospital did not disclose indications of improper treatment that were
reasonably known by the hospital, its silence constituted fraudulent concealment
of material information. 5 ' The court held that the statute was tolled before the
wife filed her claim. 2
Similarly, in Kern v. St. Joseph Hospital,53 the decedent received twenty-five
radiation treatments for bladder cancer over a five-week period.' 4 The therapy
was discontinued early.55 The doctor failed to respond when asked why treatment
was discontinued.56 Soon thereafter, the decedent noticed difficulty with urination
and bloody stools.57 Five years later, cancer was indicated as the decedent's
cause of death.58
The trial court granted, and the court of appeals affirmed, the defendant's
motion for summary judgment.59 Subsequently, the New Mexico Supreme Court
reversed the lower court's holding that the plaintiff's suit was barred by the
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 570, 698 P.2d at 440.
49. See Id.
50. See Id.
51. See Id.
52. Id. at 570-71, 698 P.2d at 440-41.
53. 102 N.M.452, 697 P.2d 135.
54. ld. at 454, 697 P.2d at 137.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 452, 697 P.2d at 135.
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statute of limitations.6' The court stated that under the doctrine of fraudulent
concealment a patient must show that the physician knew of the wrongful act,
or had material information pertinent to the discovery of the wrongful act, and
failed to disclose that information. 6 In addition, the patient must establish that
he did not know, or could not have known through reasonable diligence, of the
cause of action before the statute had run. 62
In both Kern and Keithley, the defendants argued that the defendants' duty to
disclose material information about the deceased does not extend beyond the
patient's death, when the fiduciary relationship terminates. 63 In both cases, the
court rejected the argument, refusing to accept a position that placed patients
who are injured in a better position to assert a claim than patients who die from
their injuries. 64 In Keithley, the court stated the duty to disclose continues to the
nearest relatives after the decedent's death.65
Moreover, the Court in Kern held the statute of limitations accrued from the
date of the wrongful act against a challenge by the plaintiff that there was no
malpractice until an injury occurred so that Peraltashould apply to run the statute
from the date the injury manifested itself in a physically objective manner and
was ascertainable. 6 The court distinguished the Peralta holding and its interpretation of the general statute of limitations commencement from the date of
the injury and manifestation therefrom differently from Section 41-5-13 of the
Medical Malpractice Act which does not mention "injury" and is clear and
unambiguous as starting to run from the occurrence of the wrongful act.67
Finally, Kern held that the fact that a claim may be barred before the injury
or death occurred does not violate equal protection or due process. 6 Although
the statute is harsh on latent injury cases and recognizing that the wrongful act
rule may have fallen into disfavor as a general rule on the running of the statute
of limitations and acknowledging that some jurisdictions have incorporated some
form of a discovery rule in general or for foreign object cases, the court left any
changes to our medical malpractice statute to the Legislature. 69
After Kern there can be no doubt that the clear and unambiguous language
of the statute of limitations requires the literal reading of the language of the
statute without any rules of construction that the statute begins to run from the
date of the alleged wrongful occurrence or wrongful act, and not from the time
of the injury.7'
60. Id. at 457, 697 P.2d at 140.
61. Id. at 456, 697 P.2d at 139.
62. Id. The court found that early termination of the radiation treatments, the physician's failure to
respond to the plaintiff's concems about the treatment plan, and the affidavits supporting an inference that
calculation errors of treatment doses were made created fact issues which preclude summary judgment.
63. Keithley, 102 N.M. at 571, 698 P.2d at 441; Kern, 102 N.M. at 456, 697 P.2d at 139.
64. Keithley, 102 N.M. at 572, 698 P.2d at 442; Kern, 102 N.M. at 456, 697 P.2d at 139.
65. See generally Keithley, 102 N.M. at 572, 698 P.2d at 442; Kern, 102 N.M. at 456, 697 P.2d at
139.
66. 102 N.M. at 454-455, 697 P.2d at 137-138.
67. Id. at 455, 697 P.2d at 138.
68. Kern, 102 N.M. at 455,697 P.2d at 138; see also Armijo v. Tandysh, 98 N.M. 181,646 P.2d 1245
(Ct. App. 1981).
69. Kern, 102 N.M. at 455, 697 P.2d at 138.
70. See also Irvine v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 102 N.M. 564, 698 P.2d 434 (1985). (The supreme court
quashed its writ of certiorari because the only issue the petitioner raised was the constitutionality of the
three year statute of limitations in the Act and Kern, 102 N.M. at 455, 697 P.2d at 138, upheld the
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C. Tolling by Mailing of Application
Under the Medical Malpractice Act a claimant must submit his case to the
medical review panel before he is entitled to file a complaint. 7 This submission
tolls the running of the statute of limitations.7" In Otero v. Zouhar, the supreme
court held that a claimant meets this requirement when his attorney mails the
application to the Panel.73 The supreme court noted that the Act's requirement
for claimants to "submit" their applications rather than "file" their applications
allows the court to distinguish between cases brought before the medical review
panel and actions filed in district court. 74 After tolling by submission, the statute
of limitations begins to run again thirty days after the panel issues its final
decision.75 Under Saiz v. Barham,76 the court of appeals held that the tolling
period from medical review panel consideration formally ended thirty days after
the panel mails its decision to the claimant's attorney, unless holidays or weekends fall on the thirtieth day.' Thus, the supreme court reasoned the same rule
of mailing should apply to begin the tolling period. 78
The Otero court additionally considered whether the State Superintendent of
Insurance could act as an agent for qualified health care providers when attorneys
request information on the status of those individuals or institutions.79 In Otero,
one doctor was listed as a qualified health care provider while an anesthesia
service and its employees were not listed because the Superintendent's records
were incomplete or in disorder.'e The supreme court held that the State Superintendent of Insurance acts as a statutorily named agent for the providers for the
limited purpose of providing notice of the providers' qualified or non-qualified
status. 8' In the event that the Superintendent gives erroneous information to a
prospective plaintiff, that plaintiff need not go beyond the Superintendent's representations about qualified status.82
D. Tolling Provisionsfor Minors
In Moncor Trust Co. v. Feil,"3 the court of appeals considered whether the
tolling provision for minor children in the Medical Malpractice Act applies to a
decedent's surviving children.' Cheryl Flinn, the decedent, underwent an opconstitutionality of the statute.); Murrel v. Keithley, 102 N.M. 565, 698 P.2d 435 (1985). (The supreme
court quashed writs of certiorari previously granted in this and the Keithley appeal because Kern disposed
of the legal issues involved.); see also Armijo, 98 N.M. at 181, 646 P.2d at 1245. Crumpton v. Humana,
Inc., 99 N.M. 562, 661 P.2d 54 (1983); Ealy, 100 N.M. at 250, 669 P.2d at 259.
71. N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-5-14(D) (Repl. Pamp. 1986); Otero v. Zouhar, 102 N.M. 482, 484, 697
P.2d 482, 484 (1985).
72. N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-5-22 (Repl. Pamp. 1986).
73. Otero, 102 N.M. at 484, 697 P.2d at 484. Plaintiff mailed application to the panel one day before
and the application was received three days after the statute of limitations ran. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. 100 N.M. 596, 673 P.2d 1329 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 100 N.M. 689, 675 P.2d 421 (1983).
77. Id. at 599-600.
78. Otero, 102 N.M. at 484, 697 P.2d at 484.
79. Id. at 486, 697 P.2d at 486.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 487, 697 P.2d at 487.
82. See Id.
83. 105 N.M. 444, 733 P.2d 1327 (Ct. App. 1987).
84. Id. at 445, 733 P.2d at 1328.
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eration for pacemaker implantation in El Paso, Texas, on February 20, 1978."'
Ms. Flinn was subsequently treated for heart problems by Drs. Feil and Goodman
in Deming, New Mexico.86 Ms. Flinn died on March 3, 1978.87 Over six years
later, on June 20, 1984, Moncor Trust Company, as personal representative of
the estate of Flinn, filed a wrongful death action against defendants alleging that
88
the decedent's death was due to the defendants' alleged acts of malpractice. In
addition, the complaint alleged that the beneficiaries under the Wrongful Death
Act were Ms. Flinn's two surviving minor children. 89 The eldest of Ms. Flinn's
surviving children attained the age of nine over two months after Moncor Trust
Co. filed the complaint.'
The trial court held that the Act's tolling provision for minors does not benefit
a minor who was not a patient.9 The court of appeals reached the same conclusion
by construing the tolling provision of the Act and applying it to the Wrongful
Death Act.92 The relevant provisions of the Wrongful Death Act were (1) the
provisions creating the wrongful death cause of action,93 (2) the Wrongful Death
Act's limitations provision,' and (3) the provision requiring that the action be
brought by and in the name of the decedent's personal representatives, who shall
have the exclusive right to recover all damages for the benefit of the decedent's
survivors.
The court found that the purpose of the Medical Malpractice Act is to address
factors adversely affecting the cost of medical insurance, to encourage continued
availability of professional medical services and to provide incentives for furnishing professional liability insurance.' Additionally, the court found that the
purpose of the Act's statute of limitations is to compel plaintiffs to exercise their
right of action within a reasonable time so that the party against whom the action
is brought has a fair opportunity to defend. 97 The court concluded that, in general,
the legislature intended that plaintiffs bring actions at such a time as will enable
the parties to prove material facts while the facts are reasonably fresh, before
98
proof becomes stale and memories dim, or before material evidence is lost.
Turning to the Wrongful Death Act, the court acknowledged that a beneficiary
is not a proper plaintiff, but does have a right of recovery.' The court determined
that despite the statutory beneficiaries' right of recovery under the Wrongful
Death Act, the tolling provision for minors under the Medical Malpractice Act
is personal to the minor under the disability."0 The Act cannot confer rights on
85. id.

86. Id.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id.
Id.

91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 446, 733 P.2d at 1329.

Id.

Id.
N.M. STAT.
Id. §41-2-2.
95. Id. §41-2-3.

ANN. §41-2-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1986).

96. Moncor, 105 N.M. at 446, 733 P.2d at 1329, and authority cited.

97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.

100. Id. at 446-47, 733 P.2d at 1329-30.
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persons asserting independent actions. Therefore, the court concluded Ms. Flinn's
beneficiaries under the Wrongful Death Act, her two surviving minor children,
could not take advantage of the Medical Malpractice Act's tolling provision for
minors.'' The tolling provision applies only to minors who suffer an alleged act
of malpractice; it does not apply to minors who are beneficiaries under the
Wrongful Death Act.' 2
E. Tort Claims Act's Statute of Limitations in Medical Malpractice
The Tort Claims Act's statute of limitations for governmental entity actions
differs from the statute of limitations contained in the Medical Malpractice Act
by commencing the limitation period from the occurrence resulting in loss, injury,
or death,' 03 rather than when the wrongful act occurs.
During the primary survey period, the New Mexico courts decided one case
that addresses the medical malpractice statute of limitations under the Tort Claims
Act. In Long v. Weaver, the court interpreted the limitations section of the Tort
Claims Act in a medical malpractice action against a governmental entity or
public employee. "4 Erin Long, deceased, was admitted to the University of New
Mexico Hospital (BCMC) on March 21, 1983, suffering from bleeding esophageal varices. 5 The hospital physicians attempted to stop the bleeding, but on
March 30, 1983, the physicians diagnosed a perforated esophagus. " The doctors
repaired the perforation on April 6 and April 19, 1983.'07 Erin remained hospitalized until her death on August 2, 1983. 0' Larry Long, personal representative
of Erin's estate, retained an attorney on October 11, 1983, " who obtained Erin's
medical records. "o However, Long retained a second lawyer on September 28,
1984, 1" who wrote the hospital concerning his representation of Long in a
wrongful death action against the hospital." 2 3The lawsuit was filed on August
2, 1985, two years after Erin Long's death."
Because the action was filed against a state governmental health care provider,
the court considered the statute of limitations provisions of the Tort Claims Act,
rather than the Medical Malpractice Act. '" The Tort Claims Act limitation period
provides that:
actions against a governmental entity or a public employee for torts shall
be forever barred, unless such action is commenced within two years after
101. Id.
102. Id. at 447. The court borrowed from the reasoning of Regents of University of New Mexico v.
Armijo, 103 N.M. 174, 704 P.2d 428 (1985) where the court held that the minority of a decedent, neither
a party nor a beneficiary, should not benefit an adult personal representative under no legal disability.
103. N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-4-15(A) (1978).
104. Long v. Weaver, 105 N.M. 188, 730 P.2d 491 (Ct. App. 1986).
105. Id. at 189, 730 P.2d at 492.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 190, 730 P.2d at 493. No autopsy was performed, but the certificate of death identified the
esophageal perforation as one of several causes or contributing factors leading to Erin's death. Id.
109. Id. at 190, 730 P.2d at 493.
110. Id.
Ill. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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the date of occurrence resulting in loss, injury or death, except that a minor
under the full age of seven years shall have until his ninth birthday in which
to file. This subsection applies to all persons regardless of minority or other
legal disability. "'

The court of appeals held that under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act the
statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff's injury manifests itself
and is ascertainable, rather than when the wrongful or negligent act occurs." 6
The language of the statute lends support for either interpretation by providing
the action should be commenced "within two years after the date of occurrence
resulting in the loss, injury or death." ' 7
Defendants argued that under Section 41-4-15(A) of the Tort Claims Act and
Aragon and McCoy v. Albuquerque Nat'l Bank, " the statute of limitations began
to run when there was clearly an occurrence resulting in a loss or injury.' The
defendants further argued that the cause of action should accrue at the time of
the injury rather than at the time that the full extent of the damages is ascertained. 2 oThe court of appeals rejected defendants' arguments and held that the
statute of limitations did not begin to run on the date of the occurrence because
the action did not arise under the Medical Malpractice Act.' 2' With the added
requirement under the Tort Claims Act that notice be given to the public entity
90 days after the injury, 22 it is not unreasonable to allow the filing of the action
within two years of the date of the occurrence resulting in injury instead of the
date of the wrongful act, where the action involves medical malpractice. The
different purposes and objectives of the Tort Claims Act and its statute of limitations provisions do not create an equal protection challenge for those government physicians who are not treated equally with private health care providers
whose liability is determined under the Medical Malpractice Act and its more
restrictive limitations provisions. 123
F. Probable Cause to a Medical Probability
A plaintiff proving a genuine issue of material fact on negligence is likely to
defeat a defendant's motion for summary judgment. A recent Tenth Circuit
decision, however, teaches that proof of negligence is not enough when the proof
fails on proximate cause. The Tenth Circuit in Alfonso v. Lund, 24 upheld a
directed verdict based on the plaintiff's failure to establish substantial evidence
of damages proximately caused by malpractice to a medical probability. Mr.
Alfonso accidentally severed the fingers of his right hand with a power saw. 125
115. N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-4-15(A).
116. Long, 105 N.M. at 191,730 P.2d at494.
117. N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-5-15(A).
118. Aragon and McCoy v. Albuquerque Nat'l Bank, 99 N.M. 420, 659 P.2d 306 (1983).
119. Long, 105 N.M. at 190, 730 P.2d at 493.
120. See generally Id. at 190-91, 730 P.2d at 493-94.
121. Id.at 191, 730 P.2d at 494.
122. N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-4-15 (Repl. Pamp. 1986).
123. See also Emery v. University of New Mexico Medical Center, 96 N.M. 144, 628 P.2d 1140 (Ct.
App. 198 1). (Long reaffirming prior holdings that Tort Claims Act commences running of statute and notice
provisions when injury manifests itself and is ascertainable.)
124. 783 F.2d 958 (10th Cir. 1986).
125. Id. at 959.
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Dr. Lund provided emergency surgical treatment for Mr. Alfonso.' 26 Mr. Alfonso
was transferred to New Jersey, where he received follow up treatment from Dr.
Rauschuer.' 27 Dr. Rauschuer found fault with Dr. Lund's failure to refer the
plaintiff to a specialist for re-attachment of the fingers and with Dr. Lund's
treatment techniques. 28
'
The trial court granted a directed verdict in favor of Dr. Lund on the grounds
that the plaintiff failed to establish sufficient evidence of negligence and proximate
cause. 29
' The court of appeals found that the plaintiff established a jury question
on the issues of negligence.' 3 However, a jury question on the issue of negligence, alone, was not sufficient to defeat the directed verdict.' 3 ' To complete
his claim, the plaintiff had to establish to a reasonable degree of medical probability that the injury was proximately related to the malpractice;' a mere
possibility is not sufficient to create a jury question.' 33 The plaintiff did not prove
that his disfigurement and disability was caused by the failure to reattach the
fingers.'" The plaintiff's expert, Dr. Rauschuer, could not state to a medical
probability that the re-implantation would have been successful.' 3 The Tenth
Circuit thus confirmed the New Mexico Supreme Court ruling of Buchanan v.
Downing'36 that proximate cause of an injury must rest on probabilities, not
possibilities, and must be established by expert testimony.' Evidence consisting
of surmise, speculation,
or conjecture is insufficient to survive a motion for
38
directed verdict.'

G. Negligent Infliction of Psychological Injury
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Whalley v. Sakura, ,' may chart new ground
in the area of New Mexico's medical malpractice law. United States District
Court Judge Campos directed a verdict in favor of defendant Sakura on the
plaintiff's claim of negligent post-operative care proximately causing negligent
infliction of psychological injuries. "4The court of appeals examined three issues:
126. Id.at 960.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 962.
131. Id.at 962.
132. Id. at 962-64.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Buchanan v. Downing, 74 N.M. 423, 394 P.2d 269 (1964).
137. Lund, 738 F.2d 958, 963-64. The court also rejected plaintiff's lost change theory under §323(9)
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, that the physician's negligence increased the likelihood of harm to
the patient, arguing that New Mexico courts would not likely adopt such a theory that would allow proof
for recovery on a ground less than a probability. Id. at 964-65, and conflicting authority cited.
138. Id. at 963. Other evidentiary issues were considered that permitted the plaintiff to place Dr.
Rauscher's deposition testimony before the court, including the admitting of his testimony over a surprise
objection for lack of reasonable notice of its use rather than live testimony. Id. at 96. Moreover, the Tenth
Circuit was satisfied with the trial court ruling that a New Jersey physician was competent to testify to the
knowledge and skill ordinarily used by reasonably well qualified physicians in the same field of medicine
in Alamogordo, New Mexico. Id.
139. 804 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1986).
140. The plaintiff pursued three claims: (I) lack of informed consent; (2) negligent post-operative care;
and (3) abandonment. The abandonment claim was withdrawn at the close of plaintiff's case, Id. at 582,
and the jury returned a defense verdict on the claim of informed consent.
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(1) whether the plaintiff presented a claim of negligent infliction of emotional
distress;' 4' (2) whether the evidence created ajury question on the issue of whether
Defendant Sakura's post-operative care proximately caused plaintiff's psychological injury;' 2 and (3) whether the requirement of resulting physical injury
existed to support a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress.' With
regard to the first issue, the court was convinced that the plaintiff presented a
claim of negligent infliction of psychological injury with emotional distress.'"
Liberal construction of the plaintiff's general assessments of negligence in postoperative care, coupled with the testimony of plaintiff's expert on lack of proper
post-operative communication and counselling, constituted a claim of negligent
post-operative care producing alleged psychological injury with physical manifestations. '"
The court then turned to the proximate cause issue. It found Dr. Roll's testimony sufficient to require submission to the jury the claim that negligent postoperative care caused psychological injury with physical manifestations.' The
court rejected the defendant's argument that Dr. Roll, a clinical psychologist,
was not competent to present expert testimony in a medical malpractice suit.' 47
The court found that Fierro v. Stanley's Hardware,'" which required expert
medical testimony on the causal connection between an accident and disability
in a workman's compensation case, was inapposite.' 49 The court was convinced
that a clinical psychologist can testify as to the causal connection between the
negligent act and psychological injury for cases of negligent infliction of psychological injury and emotional distress."'5 The court noted that Dr. Roll was a
professor of psychology and psychiatry at the University of New Mexico, had
published numerous scholarly articles, and was qualified to render the opinion
that, "with a high degree of scientific certainty," the plaintiff's mental distress
was causally related to the operation and its aftermath.'
Finally, the court addressed the issue of whether the requirement of resulting
physical injury existed to support a claim of negligent infliction of emotional
distress.' 52 Once again, relying on Dr. Roll's testimony, the court explained that
the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress requires some "physical
manifestations of, or physical injury to the plaintiff," that was resulting from
the emotional injury.'5 The court found, based on plaintiff's own testimony as
well as the testimony of Dr. Roll, that plaintiff's physical manifestations of loss
of energy, fatigue, psychomotor retardation or slowing down of mobility, low
energy level and sleep disturbance were sufficient physical consequences from
141. Whalley, 804 F.2d at 582.
142. Id. at 584.
143. Id. at 582-83.

144. Id. at 584.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 584.
147. Id. at 585.
148. 104 N.M. 401, 722 P.2d 652 (Ct. App. 1985), rev'don other grounds, 104 N.M. 50, 716 P.2d
241 (1986).
149. Whalley. 804 F.2d at 585.
150. Id. at 585.
151. Id. at 584-85.
152. Id. at 586.
153. Id.
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which a compensable physical injury could be inferred in an action for negligent
infliction of mental distress."
After Whalley, it appears that the Tenth Circuit has relaxed the Lund court's
requirement that proximate cause of injuries must rest on probabilities and on
55
facts regarding the medical care, and must be established by expert testimony.
A panel consisting of Chief Judge Holloway and Judges Doyle and McKay held
in Whalley that proximate cause to a medical probability could be established
by testimony from a clinical psychologist that the plaintiff's mental distress was
"with a high degree of scientific certainty,"'156 causally related to the operation
of Dr. Sakura and its aftermath. 57
' The court rejected the defendant's argument
that expert medical testimony by psychiatrists was necessary to provide competent evidence of the alleged negligent infliction of mental distress.
In one fell swoop, the Tenth Circuit has recognized a cause of action in New
Mexico of negligent infliction of psychological injury in a medical malpractice
case that can be substantiated merely by physical manifestations rather than by
physical injury.' 5' The court relied heavily on Ramirez v. Armstrong, ' a New
Mexico Supreme Court case handed down after the trial in the Whalley action.
The Ramirez court recognized an action for negligent infliction of emotional
distress to bystanders when either a physical manifestation or physical injury
results from the emotional injury of witnessing a negligent act to a family
member. The Tenth Circuit was convinced that New Mexico would recognize a
claim for negligent infliction of psychological injury with physical manifestations.
CONCLUSION
The cases decided during the two year survey period put to rest the issues
regarding the applicable statute of limitations for actions arising prior to and
after the enactment of the Medical Malpractice Act as well as issues concerning
the tolling provisions, whether by fraudulent concealment, commencement of
the tolling, or tolling by minority of a child suffering injury. Although the statute
of limitations for a medical malpractice action under the Tort Claims Act allows
the statute to accrue from the time the injury is manifested and ascertainable,
rather than the date of the wrongful act, the other protections in the Tort Claims
Act do not place governmental physicians on a different standard of care than
private physicians or expose them to a measurably greater period in which a
plaintiff may pursue an action in medical malpractice. Moreover, it is up to the
New Mexico state courts to decide whether the Tenth Circuit's decision in
Whalley opens the door to allow proof of proximate cause to a medical probability
from non-physician health care providers in medical malpractice actions that are
not actions for negligent infliction of psychological injury.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 587.
Lund, 783 F.2d at 963.
Whalley, 804 F.2d 580.
Id.
The court relied on Ramirez, 100 N.M. 538, 673 P.2d 822 (1983) forits holding.
100 N.M. 583, 673 P.2d 822 (1983).
Whalley, 804 F.2d at 587.

